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INTRODUCTION
Researchers and consultants have promoted expansion 
of Medi-Cal managed-care (MCMC) to additional Medi-Cal 
beneficiaries currently covered under the Medi-Cal Fee-for-
Service (FFS) program to achieve greater cost efficiency and 
quality of care. Proponents have also promoted MCMC as a 
cost-effective way to expand state-subsidized health insurance 
for many of the State’s 6.5 million uninsured,1 even though 
claims of this cost effectiveness have been disputed.2 This 
paper presents data that challenge the cost effectiveness of 
MCMC, and suggests that cost savings may actually represent 
cost shifting to the Medi-Cal FFS system. This in turn places 
an unfair burden on emergency physicians and other fee-
for-service Medi-Cal providers. This cost shifting appears to 
have been facilitated by the unique manner in which MCMC 
has been implemented, allowing health plans to not enroll or 
dis-enroll the most costly beneficiaries without a concomitant 
adjustment in the state’s per-member-per-month capitation 
payments. Because of the highly skewed distribution of the 
cost of care, shifting even a small number of high-cost patients 
from a MCMC health plan into the Fee-for-Service program 
allows these plans to falsely promote the reduced monthly 
cost of care per enrollee as the result of cost-effective care 
management. 
Of the 6.62 million Medi-Cal enrollees in the fiscal 
year 2007-08, 3.33 million were enrolled in MCMC, which 
receives $6.06 billion of the $33.98 billion total Medi-Cal 
budget. Even a small overestimate in the monthly cost per 
member used to calculate capitation rates has a large aggregate 
financial impact, easily reaching hundreds of millions of 
dollars annually. Ever since the Medi-Cal program began 
shifting its beneficiaries into MCMC in 1994, numerous 
claims have been made regarding the beneficial fiscal impact 
of the managed-care model on program expenditures.3 
Organizations such as the California Legislative Analyst’s 
Office4 and the Little Hoover Commission have touted the 
ability of MCMC to contain costs. Based on these assertions, 
MCMC proponents have recently introduced state legislation 
(SB 1332) to expand MCMC enrollment for aged, blind 
and disabled (ABD) populations, many of whom are prime 
candidates for dis-enrollment and carve-out cost shifting 
once per member per month (PMPM) capitation payments 
are set. However, there is little evidence that substantiates 
anticipated savings in the Medi-Cal program. In Appendix A 
(all appendixes are available online as a related file at http://
repositories.cdlib.org/uciem/westjem/vol10/iss2/art17/), the 
author assesses the validity of the claims in support of, and 
challenging, managed-care cost effectiveness in California and 
elsewhere in the country.
The Skewing of Cost Distribution in Medi-Cal 
Selection bias in managed-care is a systematic assignment 
of beneficiaries to a health plan based on health needs. 
The Medi-Cal program employs a methodology for setting 
capitation rates based on the average per capita cost of the 
eligibility cohort or population to which each beneficiary 
belongs. If, however, the population actually enrolled is 
healthier and therefore less expensive than the estimates for 
the eligible population as a whole (risk-averse selection), 
the plan benefits. Economists have studied the distribution 
of healthcare costs within populations and consistently 
found, both over time and across patient groups, that medical 
spending tends to be highly concentrated among a small 
percentage of patients, rather than spread evenly through 
the population.5,6 This skewed cost distribution means that 
the departure of even a small number of high-cost patients 
can have a large impact on the average cost of care for 
the remaining population. This perverse disincentive also 
potentially discourages health plans from including the most 
qualified specialists in their provider networks, lest this attract 
potential enrollees with more complicated health problems. 
Appendix B reviews the relevant literature on the distribution 
of costs in healthcare populations.
Focusing on the Medi-Cal population, Thomas MaCurdy et 
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among a small segment of the enrollee population. An 
enormous share of all expenditures goes to a small number 
of cases; 60 percent of all Medi-Cal expenditures went to 
benefits for only five percent of the enrollees.” The same study 
noted a near absence of expenditures for services associated 
with the least expensive 25% of the Medi-Cal population. 
The per capita cost method of calculating capitation rates 
used by Medi-Cal is similar to the methodology employed, 
and then abandoned, by the Medicare program during the 
1990s. Then, actuaries discovered that the introduction of 
managed-care into the Medicare program led to the “favorable 
selection” of healthier and less expensive beneficiaries into 
health plans, and subsequent overpayments to these plans.8 
Since the same conditions appear to exist in MCMC as did in 
Medicare, this should cause concern over the possibility that 
MCMC plans might be receiving an inappropriately higher 
allocation of limited Medi-Cal program funds. Appendix 
C reviews the Medicare experience with risk adjustment of 
Medicare managed-care capitation rates.
To understand the impact of the skewing of costs in the 
Medi-Cal population, it may help to consider a hypothetical 
TANF (Temporary Aid to Needy Families) population of 
200,000 Medi-Cal patients in a medium-sized California 
county. Assume an average cost of $125 PMPM, with eight 
months of average enrollment during the year, and total 
annual expenditures of $200 million. Next, assume that the 
patients are randomly assigned to two groups of 100,000 each, 
one enrolled in MCMC, and the other in the FFS program. 
Applying the distribution found by Berk and Monheit in 1996, 
and assuming a $125 average PMPM cost, the distribution of 
expenses for this hypothetical TANF patient population would 
appear as in the table in Exhibit 1. (Additional supporting 
tables for this illustration are in Appendix D). 
The shift of the most expensive 1% of patients (for 
example, those with chronic illnesses) out of MCMC and 
into FFS causes the average PMPM cost of the remaining 
population to decline 26% or $32, from $125 to $92 (Figure 
1). Shifting the most expensive 10% reduces the PMPM 
cost of the remaining population to $43. The shifting of the 
most expensive 1% of patients to FFS causes the average 
PMPM cost of the expanded FFS population to increase 
by $32, from $125 to $157. Shifting the most expensive 
10% increases the PMPM cost under FFS to $192. As this 
illustration demonstrates, the shifting of a very small number 
of high-cost beneficiaries from managed-care to FFS can 
drastically alter the average cost of both populations. To an 
observer unfamiliar with this phenomenon, it would be easy to 
mistakenly conclude that managed-care does hold down costs. 
Aggregate payments to the managed-care program reflect 
the loss of member months as the most expensive patients are 
dis-enrolled. The PMPM rates, however, are not recalculated 
to reflect the reduced average cost of the population, and 
this significantly improves plan profitability, even though 
capitation rates paid to MCMC plans are reduced by 5% to 
build in some of the anticipated cost savings. For example, 
Figure 1. Changes to average per member per month costs 
resulting from movement of most expensive beneficiaries from 
managed care (MC) to fee-for-service (FFS)
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Table. Beginning cost distribution of each group of beneficiaries in hypothetical California county
Total number of beneficiaries 100,000
Member months 800,000
Total annual expenditures $100,000,000.00
Percent of unduplicated beneficiaries Top 1% Top  5% Top 10% Top 50%  Bottom 50%
Number of unduplicated beneficiaries 1,000 5,000 10,000 50,000 50,000
Amount of expenditures $27,000,000 $55,000,000 $69,000,000 $97,000,000 $3,000,000
Percent of expenditures 27.0% 55.0% 69.0% 97.0% 3.0%
Member months 8,000 40,000 80,000 400,000 400,000
Per member per month $3,375.00 $1,375.00 $862.50 $242.50 $7.50
Applied to Temporary Assistance for Needy Families beneficiaries in hypothetical county.  Assumes $125 per beneficiary per month average cost.Western Journal of Emergency Medicine                             126                                         Volume X, n o . 2  :  May 2009
using a capitation rate set at $118.75, which is predicated on 
95% of the original average PMPM cost of the population, 
the shifting of even the most expensive 1% of 100,000 
beneficiaries originally enrolled in managed-care to FFS 
would result in an overpayment of $2.6 million a month, or 
$31.6 million a year. Unfortunately, these plans bank these 
unearned profits while the burden for the care of these patients 
is shifted to FFS providers at rates that are among the lowest 
in the country.9 
Causes of Non-Enrollment in Mandatory Managed-care 
Enrollment Populations
During calendar year 2005, 1,120,964 Medi-Cal 
beneficiaries assigned to aid codes for which enrollment into 
a MCMC plan is mandatory were initially enrolled under the 
FFS model (47%), or subsequently moved from MCMC into 
FFS (53%). These are disturbing figures that may not have 
been appropriately considered in the determination of PMPM 
costs or capitation rates. Certainly, the previous illustration 
suggests that the cost-shifting impact of selection bias that 
eliminates one-fourth of all potential MCMC enrollees is 
likely to be huge. The reasons a mandatory beneficiary may 
not be enrolled, or may have dis-enrolled from a health 
plan, are described in Appendix E, and include logistical 
problems such as the patient changing counties or being 
homeless, pregnancy, chronic diseases such as HIV/AIDS 
or cardiomyopathy, current cancer therapy, consideration for 
organ transplant, or pending major surgical procedures. All of 
these would be expected to drive up the cost of care for these 
prospective MCMC beneficiaries.
There appear to be policy loopholes and incentives 
allowing or encouraging pregnant women to never enroll into 
MCMC plans, or to dis-enroll when they become pregnant 
or near delivery. (In 2005, 71% of deliveries were under 
FFS.) As a consequence, some MCMC plans had higher 
rates of deliveries relative to the rates of initial enrollment 
of pregnant women in MCMC than other plans, even though 
the administrative and demographic characteristics of the 
enrollees were equivalent. Having identified this discrepancy, 
Mercer and Associates,10 the actuarial consultant for the 
Department of Health Care Services, recommended that 
the Medi-Cal program implement a maternity supplemental 
payment to the plans to cover the cost of all deliveries to 
level the playing field. The department recently followed 
this recommendation, providing approximately $7000 in 
supplemental payments to MCMC plans for each delivery 
(which, perversely, may reverse the incentive and encourage 
MCMC providers to provide prenatal care under FFS and 
enroll these pregnant women into MCMC as they near term).
Low Rates of Managed-care Enrollment in Voluntary 
Populations 
The rules determining enrollment of Medi-Cal beneficiaries 
into MCMC plans are based on the “Plan Model Type” of 
their county of eligibility. There are three major types of 
MCMC plans: 1) County Organized Health System (COHS), 
where there is one health plan run by a public agency and 
governed by an independent board. Nearly all Medi–Cal 
enrollees residing in the COHS are required to receive care 
from this system; 2) the Geographic Managed Care (GMC) 
system allows Medi–Cal beneficiaries to choose to enroll in 
one of many commercial health maintenance organizations 
(HMOs) operating in a county; and 3) the Two–Plan Model, 
which consists of counties where the department contracts 
with only two managed-care plans, one locally developed 
and operated, the other a commercial HMO, selected through 
a competitive bidding process. In the 12 “Two-plan” model 
counties and the two GMC counties, certain aid codes 
are considered “voluntary” for managed-care enrollment. 
Typically, beneficiaries in aid codes for the aged, blind and 
disabled are considered voluntary. Additionally, newborn 
babies with birth complications receiving care from the 
California Children’s Services (CCS), are often enrolled in 
aged, blind and disabled aid codes; and in that way, are not 
enrolled into MCMC. A disabled or presumptively disabled 
premature newborn is assigned to a disabled aid code. The 
premature beneficiary is then considered enrolled in FFS, not 
into MCMC. These enrollment rules enable many MCMC 
plans to manipulate enrollment and selectively limit their 
exposure to high-cost patients.
According to the Department of Health Care Services, 
enrollment data for beneficiaries assigned to voluntary aid 
codes reveal that a large proportion of the population is not 
enrolled into managed-care. To further complicate matters, 
only a small proportion of the mandatory population has 
enrolled into a MCMC delivery system. For example, while 
foster-care aid codes are considered mandatory, only 10 to 12 
percent of this population enrolls into managed-care plans. 
Foster care children are much more likely to be afflicted with 
psychological disorders or behavioral problems and display 
PMPM costs that are as much as twice that of other children 
of similar age, gender, and ethnicity (source: DHCS Medical 
Care Statistics Section).
Capitation rates based on the average cost of a given 
population are effective when all members of the population 
enroll in a plan, but become less accurate and appropriate 
as increasing numbers dis-enroll. In the voluntary aid 
code population, where 85% of the potentially eligible 
beneficiaries may never enroll, the difference between the 
cost of the potentially eligible population and the population 
that actually enrolls is likely very great. This is especially 
true if the sickest members of the population never enroll, 
but remain in the FFS model. The recent decision to require 
quarterly re-enrollment of beneficiaries in California offers 
MCMC plans yet another avenue to selectively manipulate 
enrollment.
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The Impact of “Carve-Out” or Excluded Services
Another argument for the greater cost efficiency of 
MCMC is the slower rate of increases in Medi-Cal capitation 
rates compared to other indicators of health cost inflation. 
Data show, for example, that Medi-Cal capitation rates 
have risen more slowly than the medical care component 
of the Consumer Price Index, or employer health-insurance 
premiums. Alluding to the implied cost effectiveness of 
MCMC, Mark Smith,11 president of the California Health 
Care Foundation, told a 2007 conference audience, “The 
growth of Medi-Cal Capitation Rates has been substantially 
less than commercial premiums.” While the figures may be 
accurate, the comparison itself is misleading. Not only does 
this comparison ignore the underlying age and health status 
differences of the populations being compared; it also ignores 
the difference in scope of services associated with these 
reported cost increases.
The Medi-Cal program places a wide range of services, 
known as “carve-outs,” outside the scope of its capitation 
payments to the managed-care plans for the purposes of rate 
setting and contractual service obligations. Medi-Cal patients 
who need these services must obtain them under traditional 
FFS arrangements and not through their plans. Carve-outs 
may include: CCS (California Children’s Services) payments; 
Rural Health Clinics/FQHC’s (Federally Qualified Health 
Clinic) wrap-around payments; Long-Term Care in Skilled 
Facilities; Nursing, drugs and services to patients receiving 
treatment for mental illness; treatment for HIV; and surgeries 
for organ transplantation. This process limits the exposure of 
the MCMC program to higher cost services, more expensive 
specialty care, and less predictable overhead.
While capitation payments made to MCMC plans may 
not have increased as much as employer-based insurance 
premiums, the cost of the carved-out services that are 
excluded from capitation agreements with MCMC plans 
certainly have. Between 2000 and 2006, FFS payments for 
MCMC patients rose by 113%. Some of this increase reflects 
the 27% expansion of MCMC enrollment during this period. 
However, the PMPM cost of carved-out services also rose by 
67%, indicating that on a per-person basis, carve-out costs 
rose by an average of 9.5% annually. In calendar year 2006, 
Fee-for-Service carve-out payments made by the Medi-
Cal program on behalf of MCMC enrollees totaled slightly 
less than 1.2 billion dollars12 (Figure 2). Of these, $616 
million, or 52%, were related to the CCS and the Genetically 
Handicapped Persons Program (GHPP). (See below).
CCS is a statewide program that treats children with 
certain physical limitations and chronic health conditions or 
diseases. GHPP provides health coverage for Californians 
21 and older who have specific genetic diseases, including 
cystic fibrosis, hemophilia, sickle cell disease, and certain 
neurological and metabolic diseases. GHPP also serves 
children under 21 with GHPP-eligible medical conditions 
who are not financially eligible for CCS. While it may have 
been assumed that services paid for by California Children’s 
Services (CCS) would remain static or fall in counties where 
managed-care has been introduced, MCMC plans have 
aggressively utilized CCS to provide care for premature and 
compromised infants, driving fee-for-service CCS payments 
for Managed Care beneficiaries from $230.2 million in the 
fiscal year 1999-2000 to $517.8 million in the fiscal year 
2004-2005 (Figure 3).
A FQHC is a community-based health organization that 
provides comprehensive primary care, dental and mental 
health/substance abuse services to underserved, underinsured 
and non-insured populations. FQHC carve-out payments 
represent 41% of the total cost of MCMC carve outs not 
related to CCS/GHPP. Under the federal Medicaid statute, 
Figure 3. Change in California Children’s Services payments 
under fee-for-service and Medi-Cal Managed Care
Figure 2. Fee-for-service carve-out payments for Medi-Cal 
managed care enrollees.
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when a contract between a managed-care organization and 
a FQHC results in the FQHC receiving less than the amount 
of reimbursement due under the FQHC prospective payment 
system (PPS), the state must make a supplemental “wrap-
around” payment to the FQHC to make up for the difference 
the FQHC is owed. Between 2000 and 2006 there has been a 
dramatic increase in the use of FQHC providers by MCMC 
patients. During this period MCMC wrap-around payments 
increased by 211%, while the number of managed-care 
beneficiaries utilizing FQHCs increased by 154% (Figure 4). 
The rapid increase in FQHC utilization by MCMC 
beneficiaries, which greatly outpaces the growth in MCMC 
enrollment, is worrisome for three reasons: 
1) It suggests that there are inadequate numbers of 
non-clinic affiliated physicians and physician 
groups to enable the plans to form a primary care 
network for Medi-Cal beneficiaries. 
2) Visits by managed-care patients to FQHC providers 
create millions of dollars in additional FFS carve-
out expenditures that would not exist if the health 
plans were able to contract with non-FQHC 
affiliated physicians and physician groups. 
3) While Medi-Cal would still be required to pay the 
higher FQHC rate for services incurred at clinics 
under a FFS scenario, it would do so without, in 
addition, paying a portion of a capitation rate to a 
health plan for these subcontracted primary care 
services. For the care of these patients, MCMC is 
‘double dipping’ into a limited funding pool.
CONCLUSION
In light of the indicators of cost shifting identified in this 
review, the assertion that the MCMC program is cost effective 
is highly suspect. A number of questions need to be answered 
before program administrators can claim with confidence 
that billions of dollars in Medi-Cal funds are being properly 
allocated, and that expansion of these programs to cover other 
beneficiaries is indicated. These questions include but are not 
limited to:
1) What is the distribution of costs for mandatory 
enrollment code beneficiaries that remain in, or are 
excluded or dis-enrolled from, MCMC?
2) What is the risk-adjusted distribution of costs for 
voluntary enrollment codes that elect to enroll in 
MCMC vs. FFS?
3) When adjusted for risk, how do costs compare 
between MCMC and FFS enrollees?
4) What is the actual medical loss ratio for MCMC 
plans, after full consideration of all contracting 
plan and subcontracting provider group tiers in the 
MCMC model?
5) What percentage of pregnant managed-care 
enrollees are dis-enrolled prior to delivery?
6) What are the true costs of carved-out services?
7) Do certain mandatory aid code categories with 
higher relative cost risk have a lower rate of 
enrollment in MCMC? 
8) How do risk-adjusted capitation payments affect 
Medicaid enrollment patterns, carve-outs, and 
provider networks?
The data presented here indicate that the MCMC program 
is subject to perverse incentives that adversely impact the 
Medi-Cal safety net. It is widely acknowledged that the 
average expenditure per enrollee in the Medi-Cal Program 
(California’s version of Medicaid) is one of the lowest 
in the nation. FFS providers, especially those obligated 
under Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act 
(EMTALA) to provide emergency care, believe they have 
had to bear the increasing burden of caring for those patients 
who are maneuvered out of MCMC enrollment, in return 
for FFS payments that inevitably fail to cover the provider’s 
costs. The data presented suggest that expansive carve-outs, 
enrollment loopholes, and dis-enrollment incentives misdirect 
limited Medi-Cal program funds to plans and provider 
groups, rather than to the FFS providers that actually provide 
a disproportionate share of services to high-cost Medi-Cal 
beneficiaries. The magnitude of this shift easily approaches 
several hundred million dollars per year. This undermines the 
potential benefits of applying the managed-care concept to 
those that need management the most, and under-compensates 
providers that actually render services to these patients under 
fee-for-service.
Alternatively, aligning incentives through appropriate 
risk-adjustment of capitation rates by paying much higher cap 
rates 1) to cover services that are currently carved out, 2) for 
Figure 4. Medi-Cal Manged Care Federally Qualified Healthcare 
Center wrap around payments and users - calendar year 2000-
2006
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patients that are currently exempted from managed care, and 
3) for higher cost patients that are currently being selectively 
not enrolled or dis-enrolled, and then closing these loopholes, 
could provide sufficient incentive for plans and capitated 
provider groups to actually focus on the cost-effective and 
innovative case management of these patients. This approach 
might also encourage plans to enhance their network of 
qualified providers to accomplish this goal, and reduce the 
program’s reliance on EMTALA-obligated FFS emergency 
care providers and expensive emergency department visits to 
meet these patients’ needs.
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Health Industry in an Era of Eroding Employer Coverage”1 
published in Health Affairs reported that employer-based 
coverage peaked in 2000 at 164.4 million-62 percent of the 
non-elderly population, and fell by almost five million in the 
subsequent four years. Robinson described the decline in 
employer-based coverage as a deliberate choice by insurers 
willing to accept losses in enrollment, rather than lower 
premiums or increased medical loss ratios. “These changes 
in performance”, according to Robinson, “reflect a changed 
understanding of the health insurance industry as a mature 
sector whose earnings growth rather than enrollment growth 
is the primary metric of success. Wall Street fostered and 
has celebrated this change of focus.” However, there is 
also the threat that declines in employer-based coverage 
could become too precipitous. As result, Robinson noted, 
“Shrinking employment-based enrollment, a dwindling 
supply of acquisition targets, and the specter of renewed 
price competition are driving the commercial industry toward 
diversification. Medicaid and Medicare represent the only 
segment of the health insurance world that is growing.”
As the managed care presence within Medicaid 
expanded, claims of greater efficiency and cost savings 
accruing to Medicaid programs as result of the implementation 
of managed care did not go unchallenged. A growing number 
of researchers questioned the underlying assumptions and 
supporting empirical evidence behind those claims. Writing 
in Health Affairs, attorney and patient advocate, Kip Sullivan, 
noted that the lower medical costs of health plans could not 
be directly compared to the medical costs of fee-for-service 
beneficiaries, since the total costs of health plans also include 
margins for administrative overhead and profit.6 Additionally, 
Sullivan noted, factors that have nothing to do with efficiency, 
such as the risk profile of the respective populations, may 
explain why health plan premiums may be slightly lower than 
fee-for-service premiums.
Analyzing Medi-Cal claims data; University of 
Maryland researcher Mark Duggan found no savings at all 
resulting from Medi-Cal’s implementation of managed care. 
Instead he found that the switching of beneficiaries from fee-
for-service to managed care was associated with a substantial 
increase in government spending but no corresponding 
improvement in infant health outcomes.7 According to 
Duggan’s research findings, the state paid participating Medi-
Cal managed care plans 17 percent more for the enrolled 
population than the cost would have been assuming fee-for-
service enrollment during the period 1993 through 1999.   
Other research, in addition to Mark Duggan’s, suggests that 
Medi-Cal Managed Care (MCMC) did not have the beneficial 
impact on quality of care described by its proponents. A 2001 
study compared prenatal and maternal care in the Medi-Cal 
managed care counties of San Mateo and Santa Barbara with 
the fee-for-service county of Ventura. It found that prenatal 
care use was consistently lower in the MCMC counties, 
Appendix A  
Evaluating Claims of Managed Care Cost Effectiveness
In 2004 the health care consulting firm, The Lewin 
Group, reviewed 14 selected papers on Medicaid Managed 
Care on behalf of the Association of Health Insurance Plans 
(AHIP) and concluded, “…the managed care model achieves 
access and quality improvements while at the same time 
yielding Medicaid program savings.” In a 2007 report the 
Little Hoover Commission lamented the fact that, “Less than 
half of Medi-Cal’s members are enrolled in managed care 
plans, despite research that shows managed care can lower 
costs and improve care, even for people with complex health 
needs”2. An enthusiastic Vernon Smith, former Medicaid 
Director for Michigan and now a Principal with he health 
care consulting firm, Health Management Associates, even 
declared, “…costs under managed care are less than fee-for-
service, even though managed care provides a much greater 
value, even if the costs were the same.  It is guaranteed.”
Over the past decade, the siren song of managed 
care savings has proven irresistible to policy-makers, and 
recommendations to expand the managed care presence 
within Medicaid (and Medi-Cal) have become the central 
features of many reform proposals. In 2004 the California 
Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO) reviewed the Governor’s 
“Agenda for Long-Term Reform of the Medi-Cal Program”. 
This proposal recommended that managed care coverage be 
made mandatory for families and children in counties where 
these services are now provided primarily on a fee-for-service 
basis, and urged that aged, blind, and disabled beneficiaries 
in these counties be encouraged to volunteer for enrollment 
in managed care, as well. The LAO estimated savings of $33 
million annually “based on the assumption that the state will 
pay capitation rates to health plans equivalent to 95 percent 
of what it would cost the state to provide medical services 
to these beneficiaries under the fee-for-service system.”3  
The potential for greater control over expenditures has 
been the major rationale for the expansion of managed care 
in Medicaid programs throughout the United States. The 
number of Medicaid (and Medi-Cal) beneficiaries shifted into 
managed care continues to grow, even as the managed care 
model is being discarded by increasing numbers of purchasers 
in the commercial health insurance market.  Writing in 2004, 
researchers noted that, “Between 1990 and 2002, Medicaid 
enrollment in HMOs grew from more than one million 
beneficiaries to more than seventeen million. Although total 
enrollment in HMOs nationally also grew during this time 
(by close to forty million), enrollment peaked in 1999 and has 
declined in each subsequent year.”4 
For commercial insurance plans, the Medicaid market 
presents an opportunity to replace covered lives that have 
been lost as employer-based coverage continues to decline.  
A paper by James C. Robinson entitled, “The Commercial 
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although prenatal care provision in all three counties is well 
below the national standard. One-day-stay deliveries rose 
to almost 50 percent of deliveries in the MCMC counties. 
As a result, program cost savings associated with MCMC 
enrollment appeared to primarily result from reduced 
provision of prenatal care and shorter delivery length of stay.8 
A 2007 study found that MCMC enrollment was associated 
with reduced quality of prenatal care and increased low birth 
weight, prematurity, and neonatal death.9
Investigation of the specific sources underlying the 
claims of managed care efficiency and costs savings reveals 
that they are frequently unsupported by solid empirical 
evidence, and arise from educated guesswork and conjecture. 
For example the web site of the California Medical Assistance 
Commission (CMAC), which negotiated the Department of 
Health Care Services’ contracts with managed care plans, 
advises readers that:
In fiscal year 2006-07, the estimated State General 
Fund  due to managed care rate negotiations is estimated to 
be . Since fiscal year 1995-96, the accumulated State General 
Fund annual savings associated with managed care rate 
negotiations is estimated to be in excess .10
The figures above were provided on the CMAC web 
site without source or attribution. However, in the calendar 
year 2006, total capitation payments to Medi-Cal Managed 
Care plans totaled over $5.3 billion11. The $300 million 
figure for savings represents an additional five percent. Since 
managed care capitation rates were calculated to be 95% 
of predicted fee-for-service expenditures, we can see that 
the savings figure of $300 million is likely an assumption 
based on this design feature, and not the result of a post-hoc 
analysis. An assumption, however, is not an empirical basis 
for an assertion.  Here the potential for adverse selection again 
becomes significant. If the most expensive beneficiaries have 
not enrolled, or have dis-enrolled, (removing them from the 
pool of beneficiaries used to calculate the capitation rate) the 
actual cost of providing care for the remaining beneficiaries 
would be less, in which case the CMAC savings figure would 
be overstated, or completely imaginary.
In other instances, where actual empirical studies 
are cited, claims of managed care savings arise from a more 
selective and less than rigorous interpretation of the data. 
The cost savings basis for the Little Hoover Commission’s 
recommendation to expand Medi-Cal Managed Care, for 
example, rests upon two specific sources. The first is a 2004 
study entitled “Preventing Unnecessary Hospitalizations in 
Medi-Cal: Comparing Fee-for-Service with Managed Care.”12, 
conducted for the California HealthCare Foundation, by 
researchers from the University of California, San Francisco. 
According to their research, among non-elderly Medi-
Cal enrollees the rate of avoidable hospitalizations was a 
third lower in managed care, which the researchers said 
suggested that managed care was associated with 7,000 fewer 
hospitalizations a year, accounting for $66 million in avoided 
hospitalization costs. 
A review of this paper, however, uncovers a number 
of disturbing methodological deficiencies. The UCSF 
researchers compared relatively complete fee-for-service data 
to managed care data that the DHCS advised was incomplete. 
Additionally, this team failed to control for a number of 
important confounding variables. Most notably, these include 
differences in the scope of services for which beneficiaries in 
the respective populations were eligible, and differences in 
the underlying clinical status of the respective populations. 
Without a doubt, most researchers would consider the failure 
to risk-adjust1 populations for whom health outcomes are 
being compared to be a towering and insurmountable obstacle 
to drawing any credible conclusion. 
The second study cited by the Little Hoover 
Commission as evidence of the managed care model’s greater 
cost effectiveness is The Lewin Group’s aforementioned 
paper, “Medicaid Managed Care Cost Savings – A Synthesis 
of Fourteen Studies”. Reporting the results of other studies 
is meta-research, rather than research, and was undertaken 
on behalf of an insurance industry interest group (AHIP) 
for the purpose of advocacy and public relations. Lewin 
itself, Mercer and Associates, Schaller Anderson, and other 
consultants, all of which, it should be disclosed, have many 
Medicaid health plans as their clients, conducted many 
of the underlying studies cited in this paper. As the New 
England Journal of Medicine recently observed, “Although 
the science in a submitted manuscript should be judged on its 
merits, one cannot fully appreciate a study’s meaning without 
acknowledging the subtle biases in design and interpretation 
that may arise when a sponsor stands to gain from the 
report.”13
The financial relationship between the authors 
and the object of their research does not in itself invalidate 
their findings. It does, however, justify a more thorough 
review of the underlying studies, a process that reveals 
significant variation in methodologies and findings, as 
well as conclusions frequently accompanied with carefully 
phrased caveats.  One of the fourteen studies cited by Lewin 
is the UCSF study on avoidable hospitalizations, whose 
methodological deficiencies are discussed several paragraphs 
back. Another study entitled “How Managed Care Affects 
1   “Risk adjustment is a statistical process used to identify and 
adjust for variation in patient outcomes that stem from differences in 
patient characteristics (or risk factors) across health care organizations. 
Depending on the presence of risk factors at the time of health care 
encounters, patients may experience different outcomes regardless of 
the quality of care provided by the health care organization. Comparing 
patient outcomes across organizations without appropriate risk adjustment 
can be misleading. By adjusting for the risks associated with outcomes 
of interest, risk adjustment facilitates a more fair and accurate inter-
organizational comparison.” Specifications Manual for National Hospital 
Quality Measures
http://www.maximus.com/nqmc/downloads/pdf/6ariskadjustment.pdf
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Medicaid Utilization: A Synthetic Differences Zero-Inflated 
Count model” is based on a sample of only 152 individuals. 
As noted by Lewin, the article entitled “Reforming Medicaid: 
The Experience of Five Pioneering States with Mandatory 
Managed Care and Eligibility Expansions”, states flatly, “The 
States were unable to realize their high hopes for savings from 
managed care”. This passage is found in a section of the paper 
entitled, “The States’ Costs under Managed Care Did Not 
Decline”. Lewin’s conclusions to the contrary, these fourteen 
research studies are too mixed, nuanced and conditional in 
their findings to justify the type of sweeping conclusion of 
great cost efficiencies in managed care drawn by the Little 
Hoover Commission.
While some states have reported apparent cost 
savings resulting from their implementation of Medicaid 
Managed Care, the ability of others to realize the same level 
of success is highly dependent upon the adoption of many of 
the same guiding principles, program designs, and policies 
as those states that have achieved positive results. The highly 
regarded Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System 
(AHCCCS), for example, utilizes a competitive bidding 
process by prospective participating health plans as part of 
its rate setting process.  Competitive bidding, however, has 
never been part of California’s health plan application process. 
Reviewing the AHCCCS in 1997, Nelda McCall wrote, 
“Both the state and the participating plans in AHCCCS have 
demonstrated that credible data on eligibility, enrollment, 
networks, cost, use of services, and, for long-term care 
beneficiaries, medical and functional assessments can be 
captured and play an important role in managing the program.  
Organizations that cannot provide data on plan operations 
and on the use and cost of services should be excluded from 
participation, because without such data they cannot be a cost-
effective partner for the state.”14  However, a study by Kaelin 
et al of ten states that implemented risk adjustment in their 
Medicaid Managed Care programs did find that these States 
“believed the efficiency of the payment programs improved 
and plans had more incentive to focus on providing quality 
care as opposed to selection strategies”.15
The rate-setting methodologies employed by each 
State also impact the cost-effectiveness of Medicaid managed 
care. A study describing the results of a nationwide survey of 
Medicaid managed care payment methods published in 1999, 
“Medicaid Managed Care Payment methods and Capitation 
Rates”, concluded that, “there is considerable variation among 
states in how rates are set.”16 They noted that only two states, 
Colorado and Maryland, had in 1999 implemented health-
based risk-adjustment systems for their Medicaid population. 
The authors found that many other factors also affect the cost 
effectiveness of managed care. These include the number of 
participating plans and level of competition, the amount of 
excess provider capacity, and the willingness of hospitals to 
accept lower rates from plans. Furthermore, the delegated 
model of managed care in California allows MCMC plans to 
contractually delegate not just care responsibility, but also risk 
and claims payment responsibility, to second and even third 
tier entities.  With each successive level of delegation, there 
is less and less of the State’s capitated payment available for 
actual health care services to the enrollee; and thus greater 
incentive for these at-risk provider groups to use risk-aversive 
selection and carve-out loopholes to maximize profits and 
limit costs.
Therefore generalized statements about the benefits 
of the managed care model cannot be made without knowing 
whether the implementing State’s program design and unique 
policies help promote or undermine the objectives and 
rationale of the program.
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Appendix B
Distribution of Costs throughout Health Care Populations: 
Review of the Relevant Literature
  A wide body of literature confirms the existence of 
selection bias in patterns of health plan enrollment and dis-
enrollment. Much of this research resulted from efforts to 
study the outcome of the introduction of private health plan 
enrollment to Medicare program beneficiaries. Other research 
focusing on the commercial insurance sector explores the 
shift of beneficiaries from traditional to high deductible, high 
co-pay health plans. Lastly there have been several studies 
that have found selection bias to exist within the Medi-Cal 
program itself.  
  Research focusing on the concentration and skewing 
of expenditures within health care populations include: The 
Concentration of Health Expenditures: an Update (1992) and 
The Concentration of Health Care Expenditures, Revisited 
(2001) by Marc L. Bark and Alan C. Monet, The Persistence 
in the Level of Health Expenditures over Time: Estimates 
for the U.S. Population, 2002–2003 (2006) by Cohen, 
Steven B, and The High Concentration of U.S. Health Care 
Expenditures, by Mark W. Stanton. 
  Bark and Monet found that in 1987 the top 1 percent 
of spenders accounted for 30 percent of aggregate health 
spending. Updating their research through 1996, they found 
that the skewed concentration of health care expenditures 
remained stable, with only slight changes in the percent of 
spending generated by the top one and five percent of spenders 
occurring between the two studies. They indicated “A 
comparison of the payment-based spending estimates in 1987 
and 1996 reveals a remarkable stability in the concentration 
of expenditures over the past decade. In 1996 we find that 
the top 1 percent of the population accounted for 27 percent 
of aggregate expenditures, while our adjusted 1987 estimate 
is 28 percent. We also find that the top 5 percent of spenders 
accounted for more than half of health spending in both years, 
while the top 10 percent accounted for more than two-thirds. 
These tabulations also are generally quite similar to those 
derived from data for 1970, 1977, and 1980.”
  Using information from the household component 
of the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS-HC), 
Steven Cohen and William Yu found that in 2002, 1 percent 
of the population accounted for 22 percent of total health 
expenditures, and the lower 50 percent of the population 
ranked by their expenditures accounted for only 3 percent of 
the total.2 
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Appendix C  
The Medicare Experience with Risk Adjustment
Legal authority for HMO participation in the 
Medicare program can be traced to the HMO Act of 
1972 and the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 
1982 (TEFRA). TEFRA introduced payments on a “risk-
sharing” basis between Medicare and the HMOs. Under 
these arrangements, interim payments were made, and the 
costs incurred each year by the HMO were compared with 
the adjusted average per capita costs (AAPCC), and with 
estimates of the costs beneficiaries would have incurred 
under traditional fee-for-service Medicare. Carlo Baraboo, 
author of “Milestones in Medicare Managed Care”, noted 
that, “Aspic’s were computed for each county of the United 
states, with separate rates for the disabled and elderly, and 
certain adjustment factors were applied to better approximate 
fee-for-service (FFS) costs: age, sex, institutional status, and 
Medicaid status. However, there was still no direct health 
status adjuster. As would become evident, the lack of a health 
status adjuster meant that there was still not a perfect fit in the 
payment methodology.”
After a period of decline in the late 1980s, Medicare 
Table. Distribution of Health Expenditures for the U.S. 
Population, By Magnitude of Expenditures2
Percent of US Population 
Ranked By Percentile
Percent of Expenditures 
(1996)
Top 1% 27%
Top 2% 38%
Top 5% 55%
Top 10% 69%
Top 30% 90%
Top 50% 97%
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HMO enrollment began once again to grow in the early 
1990’s reflecting the rise of the managed care model overall. 
There was a concurrent increase, however, in concern that the 
AAPCC-calculated rate methodology encouraged selection 
bias in the enrollment patterns of the Medicare population. 
A number of studies focusing on Medicare’s managed care 
experience during the nineteen nineties found evidence 
that adverse selection of high-cost beneficiaries away from 
managed care had increased program expenditures
Kathleen Thieve-Call, Bryan Dowd, Roger Feldman 
and Matthew Maciejewski found that favorable selection was 
associated with enrollment into Medicare risk HMOs.2   Using 
pre-enrollment Medicare reimbursements as an indicator of 
beneficiary health status, it was determined that beneficiaries 
joining an HMO in 1994 were healthier than those remaining 
in FFS.  Further, it was noted that favorable selection declines 
as HMO market share and HMO growth rate increases, but it 
does not disappear until the HMO market share reaches 100 
percent.
A GAO report in 20003 entitled “Medicare + Choice 
Payments Exceed Cost of Fee-For-Service Benefits, Adding 
Billions to Spending”, noted that aggregate payments 
to Medicare + Choice plans in 1998 totaled about $5.2 
billion (21 percent), or approximately $1,000 per enrollee, 
more than payments to the traditional Fee-For-Service 
program (FFS).  Further, the analysis concluded that excess 
payments, not managed care efficiencies, enabled plans to 
attract beneficiaries.  Managed care plans offered a more 
comprehensive benefit package than the one available to FFS 
beneficiaries, while charging modest to no premiums.  Nearly 
all of the 210 plans analyzed in this study received capitated 
payments during 1998 that exceeded the actual costs for 
services rendered because their enrollees were healthier than 
average beneficiaries.
In response to these reports and many others with 
similar findings, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 directed 
the US Health And Human Services Agency to implement 
a new payment method for Medicare managed care plans, 
known as Risk-Adjustment that would reflect the underlying 
health status of the Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in each 
plan. The new payment methodology was to be phased in 
over five years. “There is widespread agreement among health 
care experts that risk-adjusted payments will pay plans more 
fairly and reduce incentives for plans to enroll only healthier 
beneficiaries,” said HHS Secretary Donna Shalala in January 
1999 as she announced the implementation of the new 
payment methodology.4
Not surprisingly, Medicare Managed Care plans 
objected to the implementation of risk adjustment.  In an 
article by Laura Steiner in the Journal of Law, Medicine 
& Ethics, 27, no. 1 (1999): 105-06, the author noted that: 
“Charles Kahn, lobbyist and president of the Health Insurance 
Association of America, said that the risk-adjustment 
methodology is fundamentally flawed because it is based on 
length of hospitalization, and one of the goals of managed 
care is to reduce hospital stays. The chief lobbyist for Blue 
Cross Blue Shield of Florida, Melissa Raefus, commented 
that HMOs encourage preventive health care measures, such 
as regular check-ups and early treatment of illness, to reduce 
more costly hospitalization. The risk-adjustment methodology 
based on length of hospital stay would penalize HMOs that 
use a preventative approach to health care. Former HCFA 
administrator Bruce Vladeck acknowledged that basing cost 
categories on length of hospitalization is not ideal. According 
to Vladeck, HCFA is forced to use this method, because the 
managed care industry will not give it more extensive data 
on patient treatment. Vladeck remarked, “To me, the HMOs 
complaining that the risk adjustment is flawed is the moral 
equivalent of murdering your parents and then complaining 
you’re an orphan.”    Most plans eventually did learn to 
accommodate to risk adjustment in the Medicare Managed 
Care program, and it is generally believed that risk adjustment 
has encouraged plans to focus more on providing quality care 
(and accurate data gathering), and less on selection strategies.
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Appendix E
 
Reasons for Not Enrolling, or Dis-enrolling Medi-Cal 
Managed Care Beneficiaries 
Time to enroll. Sixty to ninety days may be required to 
contact a beneficiary following the date he or she becomes 
eligible for Medi-Cal and complete their enrollment into a 
health plan.
Logistical difficulties contacting beneficiaries. Errors in the 
beneficiary’s address information or a beneficiary’s transient 
or “homeless” residential status may result in an inability to 
make contact for the purpose of health plan enrollment. 
Exhibit 2 Table. Impact of Dis-enrollment of Most Expensive Beneficiaries on Average Cost of Remaining Managed Care Population
Percent of Population Number of Unduplicated Beneficiaries Amount of Expenditures Member Months PMPM Cost
Entire Population 100,000 $100,000,000 800,000 $125.00
Less Most Expensive 1% 99,000 $73,000,000 792,000 $92.17
Less Most Expensive 5% 95,000 $45,000,000 760,000 $59.21
Less Most Expensive 10% 90,000 $31,000,000 720,000 $43.06
Appendix D
Impact of Dis-enrollment / Non-enrollment – An Illustration
Supporting Tables
Exhibit 3 Table. Impact of Dis-enrollment of Most Expensive Beneficiaries from Managed Care and Back into Fee-For-Service
Percent of Population Number of Unduplicated Beneficiaries Amount of Expenditures Member Months PMPM Cost
Original Population (FFS) 100,000 $100,000,000 800,000 $125.00
Adding Most Expensive 
1% from MC
101,000 $127,000,000 808,000 $157.18
Adding Most Expensive 
5% from MC
105,000 $155,000,000 840,000 $184.52
Adding Most Expensive 
10% from MC
110,000 $169,000,000 880,000 $192.05
Exhibit 4 Table. Change in Average Per-Member, Per-month Cost of the Managed Care Population, and Resulting Over-payment, as 
the Most Expensive Beneficiaries are Shifted to Fee-For-Service
Expenditure Original Population MC’s Most Expensive 
1% Shifted to FFS
MC’s Most Expensive 
5% Shifted to FFS
MC’s Most Expensive 
10% Shifted to FFS
Capitation Payment at 95% 
Original PMPM ($125)
$118.75 $118.75 $118.75 $118.75
PMPM for Remaining 
Population
$125.00 $92.17 $59.21 $43.06
Overpayment (PMPM) $(6.25) $26.58 $59.54 $75.69
Remaining Beneficiaries 100,000 99,000 95,000 90,000
Aggregate Monthly 
Overpayment
$(625,000) $2,631,250 $5,656,250 $6,812,500
Aggregate Annual 
Overpayment
$(7,500,000) $31,575,000 $67,875,000 $81,750,000
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Other Health Care Coverage. Beneficiaries in mandatory aid 
codes with other health care coverage are not eligible to enroll 
in a Medi-Cal health plan.
Medical Exemption. Granted through Medi-Cal’s enrollment 
contractor HCO (Health Care Options). The types of dis-
enrollment requests handled by HCO include Medical 
Exemption Requests (MERS), Emergency Dis-enrollment 
Exemption Requests (EDER), Retroactive Dis-enrollment 
requests (RETRO), and the Plan Dis-enrollment Request 
(PID). Medi-Cal Managed Care policy regarding exemptions 
allows dis-enrollment for any of the following medical 
reasons2:
Pregnancy, • 
Under evaluation for organ transplants or approved  • 
for and awaiting transplant,
Receiving chronic renal dialysis treatment, • 
HIV positive or diagnosed with AIDS, • 
Diagnosed with cancer and currently receiving a  • 
course of accepted therapy (such as chemotherapy or 
radiation),
Approved for a major surgical procedure by the  • 
Medi-Cal FFS program and awaiting surgery or 
immediately post-operative,
Has another  not listed above, such as  • 
cardiomyopathy or amyotrophic lateral sclerosis that 
is already under treatment,
Is enrolled in a Medi-Cal waiver program that  • 
allows the individual to receive sub-acute, acute, 
intermediate or skilled nursing care at home rather 
than in a sub-acute care facility, an acute care 
hospital, an intermediate care facility or a skilled 
nursing facility, or
Is participating in a pilot project organized and  • 
operated pursuant to §§14087.3, 14094.3, or 14490 
of the Welfare and Institutions Code
Exemptions granted by the Medi-Cal Managed Care 
Office of the Ombudsman.  According to the web site for 
2  MCMCD All-Plan letter 00013 dated December 28, 2000 and 
CCR Section 53887
the Medi-Cal Managed Care Office of the Ombudsman 
a beneficiary may be exempted out of enrollment in a 
managed care plan if they “receive health services from an 
Indian Health Provider”, “receive health services through an 
approved Medi-Cal waiver program”, or “are being treated for 
a  medical condition.”3
Relocation to new county. Beneficiaries may dis-enroll from 
managed care plans as result of relocating to a new county, 
beyond the plan’s area of operation.
Changed aid codes. Beneficiaries may dis-enroll from 
managed care plans as result of switching from a mandatory to 
voluntary or excluded aid code.
The reasons a mandatory beneficiary may not be enrolled, 
or may have dis-enrolled from a health plan include the 
following:
Failure to enroll within the time limit 1. 
Inability to make contact / homeless residential status 2. 
Enrollee has other health care coverage 3. 
Medical Exemption granted through Medi-Call’s  4. 
Enrollment Contractor HCO for: pregnancy, organ 
failure pending transplantation, chronic renal dialysis 
treatment, HIV positive status, cancer undergoing 
chemotherapy or radiation treatment,  pending or 
recent major surgical procedures, and complex and/
or progressive disorder not listed above, such as 
cardiomyopathy or amyotrophic lateral sclerosis 
under treatment, enrollment in a Medi-Cal waiver 
program for sub-acute, acute, intermediate or skilled 
nursing care at home, or participation in certain pilot 
projects.
Exemptions granted by the Medi-Cal Managed Care  5. 
Office of the Ombudsman, as when receiving health 
services through an Indian Health Provider” or an 
approved Medi-Cal waiver program.
Relocation to new county. 6. 
Switching from a mandatory to a voluntary or  7. 
excluded aid code.
3  “Common Questions and Issues”, http://www.dhs.ca.gov/mcs/
mcmcd/PDF/Ombudsman_Information/20070705%20OMB%20Frequent-
ly%20Asked%20Questions%20FINAL.pdf
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